Aloha,
Chuck Mendoza sent another insightful article:
"Subject: INSIGHTS - THE WAR
Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in
1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border and in
this capacity have traveled all along the border region between the two
countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's
mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian
employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO.
In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as
decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines, and by a special
proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were
considered to "martyrs" even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program
is the most respected relief effort in the country and because of this I had the
opportunity to travel extensively, without too much interference or restriction.
I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community
and read a great deal on the subject.
I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite
frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had
time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them
as a basis for sharing some observations.
First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I
want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments about
our "enemy."
Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated
beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live
day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and
deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. The
country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They know
very little of the world at large, and have no access to information or
knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They
have nothing left, nothing that is except for their pride.
Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred
to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders and
their military cohort, the Taliban.
The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the
war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with
assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to
by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more
fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former
Mujehdeen.
Over time this military support along with financial support has allowed OBL
and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is
the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards protect senior
Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which
were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to
do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.
This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or
so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local
Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to
decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have
worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher. It is my
assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the
Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces
and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun
tribes in Pakistan or from OBL.
OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action were probably on their way to
sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have
experienced in Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment. During the Afghan
war with the Soviets much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the
Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time and most of us had
high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the
brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets. Those concepts
were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation,
are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of
noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural
constraints that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor.
Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).
Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters
owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing allegiance upwards
and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while
the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the
Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such
groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the
concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance
and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a
perceived or actual slight.
That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the
Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of
Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the
war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our
fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in and were
given to one Mujehdeen group, another group-supposedly on the same side,
attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they
wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige. Many
larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the
various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as
blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to
seek glory.
In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities
were lower for all involved.
As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT
good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the
Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to
Dr. Kern's point about will.
During their history the only events that have managed to form any
semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders.
And in doing this the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest
military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability,
kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military
units. The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the
weather and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their
advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair
generals--around November 1st most road movement is impossible, in part
because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air
movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid
to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a
fight.
Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming
consensus was that we were cowards, who would not risk one life in face to
face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent,
that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the
perception that the US does not have any "will" and that were are morally and
spiritually corrupt.
Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs
and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles
and their lack of external support.
More importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their
strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to
hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain
valleys.
I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well
beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second guess
current plans or start an academic debate I would share the following from
what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.
First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy
off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter.
Second, also with this cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban
leadership making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on
existing discord.
Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it
over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of
most Afghans.
Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance
to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give
these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation
or dying fighting the "infidel."
Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under
Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again to
demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace.
Sixth, I would consider vary carefully putting any female service members into
Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our class but within that culture a
man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need
respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a
man who fights with women.
I would hold off from doing anything to dramatic in the new term, keeping a
low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this
pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already
developing. expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We
can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after.
When we do "pick-up" the pieces I would make sure that we do so on the
ground, "man to man." While I would never want to advocate American
causalities, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching
that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat."
As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry
operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the
defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American
resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat.
And once this is all over, unlike in 1989 the US must provide continued
long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.
While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a
few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the
Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that
they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange.
During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist
prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in
prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home
with them. This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya
were similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for
those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way.
Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners
having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate
their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek
wholesale revenge against civilian populations and to turn this into the world
wide religious war that they desperately want.
This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration of
this type of activity please read Kipling). This will not be a pretty war; it will be
a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a
character.
Towards our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been
part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our
enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war.
We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many,
but for shrewd military logic.
For anyone who is still reading this way to long note, thanks for your patience.
I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise manner.
Thanks,
Richard Kidd"
Chuck Mendoza sent another insightful article:
"Subject: INSIGHTS - THE WAR
Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in
1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border and in
this capacity have traveled all along the border region between the two
countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's
mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian
employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO.
In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as
decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines, and by a special
proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were
considered to "martyrs" even an "infidel" like myself. The mine action program
is the most respected relief effort in the country and because of this I had the
opportunity to travel extensively, without too much interference or restriction.
I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community
and read a great deal on the subject.
I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite
frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had
time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them
as a basis for sharing some observations.
First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I
want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments about
our "enemy."
Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated
beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live
day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and
deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. The
country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They know
very little of the world at large, and have no access to information or
knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They
have nothing left, nothing that is except for their pride.
Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred
to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders and
their military cohort, the Taliban.
The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the
war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with
assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to
by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more
fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former
Mujehdeen.
Over time this military support along with financial support has allowed OBL
and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is
the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards protect senior
Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which
were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to
do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.
This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or
so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local
Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to
decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have
worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher. It is my
assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the
Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces
and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun
tribes in Pakistan or from OBL.
OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action were probably on their way to
sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have
experienced in Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment. During the Afghan
war with the Soviets much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the
Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time and most of us had
high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the
brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets. Those concepts
were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation,
are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of
noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural
constraints that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor.
Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).
Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters
owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing allegiance upwards
and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while
the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the
Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such
groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the
concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance
and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a
perceived or actual slight.
That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the
Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of
Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the
war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our
fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in and were
given to one Mujehdeen group, another group-supposedly on the same side,
attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they
wanted to use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige. Many
larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the
various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as
blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to
seek glory.
In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities
were lower for all involved.
As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT
good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the
Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to
Dr. Kern's point about will.
During their history the only events that have managed to form any
semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders.
And in doing this the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest
military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability,
kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military
units. The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the
weather and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their
advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair
generals--around November 1st most road movement is impossible, in part
because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air
movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid
to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a
fight.
Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming
consensus was that we were cowards, who would not risk one life in face to
face combat. Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent,
that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the
perception that the US does not have any "will" and that were are morally and
spiritually corrupt.
Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs
and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles
and their lack of external support.
More importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their
strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to
hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain
valleys.
I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well
beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second guess
current plans or start an academic debate I would share the following from
what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.
First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy
off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter.
Second, also with this cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban
leadership making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on
existing discord.
Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it
over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of
most Afghans.
Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance
to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give
these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation
or dying fighting the "infidel."
Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under
Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again to
demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace.
Sixth, I would consider vary carefully putting any female service members into
Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our class but within that culture a
man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need
respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a
man who fights with women.
I would hold off from doing anything to dramatic in the new term, keeping a
low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this
pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already
developing. expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We
can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after.
When we do "pick-up" the pieces I would make sure that we do so on the
ground, "man to man." While I would never want to advocate American
causalities, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching
that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat."
As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry
operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the
defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American
resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat.
And once this is all over, unlike in 1989 the US must provide continued
long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.
While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a
few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the
Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that
they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange.
During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist
prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in
prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home
with them. This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya
were similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for
those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way.
Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners
having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate
their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek
wholesale revenge against civilian populations and to turn this into the world
wide religious war that they desperately want.
This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration of
this type of activity please read Kipling). This will not be a pretty war; it will be
a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a
character.
Towards our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been
part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our
enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war.
We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many,
but for shrewd military logic.
For anyone who is still reading this way to long note, thanks for your patience.
I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise manner.
Thanks,
Richard Kidd"



